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“I’LL KNOW IT WHEN I SEE IT”: DEFENDING THE 
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU’S 
APPROACH OF INTERPRETING THE SCOPE OF UNFAIR, 
DECEPTIVE, OR ABUSIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES 
(“UDAAP”) THROUGH ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
Stephen J. Canzona† 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. financial crisis of 2007–2009 exposed the tragic consequences that can 
occur when vulnerable consumers fall prey to onerous or egregious terms contained 
in financial services contracts.1  This vulnerability was particularly apparent in the 
U.S. housing market, where a combination of factors—including deceptive market-
ing terms, imprudent mortgage loan underwriting, and lack of borrower awareness 
and education—contributed to a housing “bubble” that ultimately burst, resulting in 
billions of dollars in losses in mortgages and mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”).2  
When the dust finally settled, consumers lost a staggering $17 trillion in household 
net wealth between 2007 and the first quarter of 2009, and 26.2 million Americans 
remained unemployed as of November 2010.3 
Congress created the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (“FCIC”) to examine 
the causes of the recent financial crisis, including fraud and abuse in the financial 
sector.4  The FCIC identified “widespread failures in financial regulation and super-
vision,” noting that regulators often “lacked the political will. . . as well as the forti-
tude to critically challenge the institutions and the entire system they were entrusted 
to oversee.”5  Indeed, Vincent Reinhart, a former Director of the Federal Reserve 
Board (“FRB”)’s Division of Monetary Affairs conceded that “he and other regula-
†   J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2019; B.S., Georgetown University, 2007.  I would like to 
thank Professor Judy Fox for her support and guidance throughout the writing process, and the members of the 
Notre Dame Journal of Legislation for their diligent editing.  Most of all, I would like to thank my family and 
friends for their constant love and encouragement.  All errors are my own. 
1   See Eric M. Aberg, Note, The Case for UDAAP-Based Credit Card Lending Regulations: Providing 
Greater Financial Security for America and American Consumers, 84. GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1029 (2016). 
2   FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL INQUIRY REPORT, xvi, 6-7 (2011) 
[hereinafter FCIC REPORT], available at http:www.fcic.gov/report/ (noting that the pro-
liferation of these products had the effect of “confounding consumers who didn’t examine 
the fine print, baffling conscientious borrowers who tried to puzzle out their implications, 
and opening the door for those who wanted in on the action.”). 
3   Id. at 391-392. 
4   Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-21 (2009). 
5   FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at xviii. 
  
 Journal of Legislation 61 
tors failed to appreciate the complexity of the new financial instruments and the dif-
ficulties that complexity posed in assessing risk.”6 
Cognizant of the shortcomings in the existing regulatory framework for con-
sumer financial products, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”)7 in 2010.  Significantly, the Dodd-
Frank Act created a new independent federal agency, the Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau (“CFPB” or “Bureau”) to “regulate the offering and provision of con-
sumer financial products or services under the Federal consumer financial laws.”8  
The CFPB has supervisory authority over banks and credit unions with assets over 
$10 billion, as well as certain nonbank financial companies.9  Pursuant to the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (“CFPA”),10 the CFPB also has the power to 
investigate and bring enforcement actions against supervised entities involving alle-
gations of so-called “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices” (“UDAAP” 
claims).11  Commentators were quick to point out that federal regulators have policed 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices (“UDAP”) for decades.  So, what’s the source of 
the most recent controversy?  Like many federal statutes, the devil lies in the details 
of the CFPA.  In particular, UDAAP’s newest term—“abusive”—has generated con-
siderable debate.  The CFPB has indicated that “the legal standards for abusive, un-
fair, and deceptive each are separate,”12 but some critics have charged that the Bureau 
has failed to provide adequate guidance concerning what constitutes a statutorily pro-
hibited “abusive” act or practice.13  In spite of this criticism, the Bureau has made it 
clear that it will still bring enforcement actions against supervised entities if it be-
lieves their actions violated the plain language of the CFPA, even in the absence of 
formal rulemaking or other agency guidance.14 
This Note weighs in on the current debate and argues that the CFPB’s practice 
of interpreting UDAAP standards through enforcement actions strikes the proper bal-
ance between safeguarding the interests of consumers and responsible providers of 
financial services.  Part I of this Note provides a brief history of UDAAP statutes as 
                                                          
6   FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 45. 
7   Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203 (2010). 
8   12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2012). 
9   See CFPB FACTSHEET – ENFORCING FEDERAL CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 1-2 (2016), available at 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/07132016_cfpb_SEFL_anniversary_factsheet.pdf (noting that 
“nonbanks include mortgage lenders and servicers, payday lenders, and private student lenders of all sizes, as 
well as larger participants in the debt collection, consumer reporting, auto finance, student loan servicing, and 
international money transmission markets.”). 
10   Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. X, 124 Stat. 1955 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5481–5603 
(2012)). 
11   12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2012). 
12   CFPB, SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL (2017), at UDAAP 9 (hereinafter “Aug. 2017 
CFPB MANUAL”). 
13   See Martin J. Bishop, The CFPB’s Powers Continue to Expand; UDAAP is Still a Potential Black 
Hole For Consumer Financial Services Companies, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT 4 (2012), available 
at https://www.foley.com/files/Publication/2c47b9d8-2cdb-4989-a556-11966f4e201c/Presentation/Publica-
tionAttachment/e1c7cb83-7a96-4f5b-8c18-5d58dc6631af/Bishop%20Thomson%20Reu-
ters%203%2015%2012.pdf. 
14   See John Villa & Ryan Scarborough, The Law of Unintended Consequences: How the CFPB’s Un-
precedented Legislative Authority and Enforcement Approach Has Invited Increasing Challenges, BANKING & 
FIN. SERVS. POLICY REPORT 3 (July 2016). 
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a mechanism for government enforcement and explains the rationale for expanding 
the reach of UDAP to prohibit abusive conduct.  Part II examines selected judicial 
and legislative challenges to the CFPB’s UDAAP enforcement authority and assesses 
why they have largely fallen short of their intended goals.  Part III outlines a case for 
upholding the CFPB’s existing approach, arguing that the CFPB’s enforcement ac-
tions and compliance bulletins issued to date provide financial industry participants 
with ample precedent of what constitutes unfair, deceptive, and abusive conduct and 
do not present substantive due process concerns. 
 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE UDAAP DOCTRINE 
Unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices (“UDAAPs”) are direct descend-
ants of their unfair or deceptive acts or practices (“UDAP”) ancestors.  Historically, 
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has had the power to prevent nonbank enti-
ties from using “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” under 
§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”).15  Similarly, U.S. banking reg-
ulators had the authority to enforce § 5 for the banking entities they supervised.16  
The Dodd-Frank Act transferred rulemaking and enforcement authority over con-
sumer financial products from these banking regulators to the CFPB with respect to 
insured depository institutions or credit unions with total assets of $10 billion or 
greater (so-called “too-big-to-fail” banks).17  After Dodd-Frank, prudential banking 
regulators retained this authority with respect to insured depository institutions or 
credit unions with less than $10 billion in total assets.18  Similarly, the FTC retained 
its authority to “enforce those rules and to continue defining acts or practices that are 
unfair or deceptive with regards to non-depository institutions.”19  The Dodd-Frank 
Act further requires the CFPB and FTC to coordinate their efforts with respect to 
enforcement actions “regarding the offering or provision of consumer financial prod-
ucts or services.”20 
States have crafted their own consumer protection laws based on a handful of 
                                                          
15   See Laurie A. Lucas, Adam D. Maarec & John C. Morton, “Abusive” Acts or Practices Under the 
CFPA’s UDAAP Prohibition, 71 BUS. LAW. 749 (2016) (citing the Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012)). 
16   See FED. DEP. INS. CORP., FDIC COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL, SECTION VII: ABUSIVE 
PRACTICES (2015) at VII-1.1 (“hereinafter NOV. 2015 FDIC MANUAL”) (identifying these banking regulators 
as: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the FRB, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(“OCC”) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTC”), and noting these agencies may coordinate UDAP en-
forcement activity if a UDAP involves an entity or entities over which more than one agency has enforcement 
authority). 
17   See 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b) (2012) (transferring consumer protection functions from the enumerated 
agencies to the CFPB). 
18   12 U.S.C. § 5516 (2012). 
19   Norman I. Silber, Reasonable Behavior at the CFPB, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 87, 101 n.77 
(2012).  See also 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b)(5)(C)(ii) (2012) (clarifying that “the Federal Trade Commission shall 
have authority to enforce under the Federal Trade Commission Act . . .  a rule prescribed by the Bureau under 
this title with respect to a covered person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission under that 
Act, and a violation of such a rule by such a person shall be treated as a violation of a rule issued under section 
18 of that Act . . .  with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”). 
20   12 U.S.C. § 5514 (2012).  See also FTC & CFPB, Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Federal Trade Commission (2012), 
http://ftc.gov/os/2012/01/120123ftc-cfpb -mou.pdf. 
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model acts (including the FTC Act).21  State Attorneys General (“State AGs”) often 
bring similar lawsuits alleging UDAP-based violations pursuant to their authority to 
act in the public interest and enforce state laws.22  Alternatively, individual consum-
ers acting as “private AGs” may initiate their own lawsuits alleging violations of state 
UDAP laws, subject to certain restrictions.23  In April 2011, the CFPB and the Pres-
idential Initiative Working Group of the National Association of Attorneys General 
(“NAAG”) announced a Joint Statement of Principles to better coordinate law en-
forcement practices between federal and state officials in the consumer financial ser-
vices arena.24 
In discussing the principles underlying “unfair” and “deceptive” practices, the 
CFPB has noted that “[t]he Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and federal banking 
regulators have applied these standards through case law, official policy statements, 
guidance, examination procedures, and enforcement actions that may inform 
CFPB.”25  In this vein, the Bureau has largely adopted the FTC’s definitions of these 
terms.26 
 
1. The “Unfairness” Standard 
The FTC has indicated that an act or practice is “unfair” when it: “(1) causes or 
is likely to cause substantial injury (usually monetary) to consumers, (2) cannot be 
reasonably avoided by consumers, and (3) is not outweighed by countervailing ben-
efits to consumers or to competition.”27  A “substantial injury” can take the form of 
either monetary or reputational harm.28  In addition, consumers need only take rea-
sonable steps to avoid injury—for example, they would not need to hire independent 
experts to test consumer products in advance.29  Examples of acts or practices where 
a consumer could not reasonably avoid injury include: (1) if material information 
about a product, such as pricing, was missing or withheld from the consumer until 
after the consumer had committed to purchasing the product; (2) product disclosures 
that inadequately explained the terms of the act or practice to the consumer; or (3) 
where a consumer was coerced into purchasing unwanted products or services.30  
                                                          
21   NAT’L POLICY & LEGAL ANALYSIS NETWORK, CONSUMER PROTECTION: AN OVERVIEW OF STATE 
LAWS AND ENFORCEMENT 1 (2010), available at http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/re-
sources/phlc-fs-agconsumer-2010.pdf. 
22   Id. 
23   See id. at 1–2 (noting that “private lawsuits may not be able to obtain the full range of remedies 
available to state AGs” and that “the law may impose additional evidentiary burdens on consumers, such as 
requiring them to prove that they relied on the specific practice they are suing over, or that the defendant’s 
conduct affects the public at large.”). 
24   Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and National Association of Attorneys General 
Presidential Initiative Working Group Release Joint Statement of Principles, CFPB (Apr. 11, 2011), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-and-national-as-
sociation-of-attorneys-general-presidential-initiative-working-group-release-joint-statement-of-principles/ 
25   AUG. 2017 CFPB MANUAL, supra note 12, at UDAAP 1. 
26   Id. at UDAAP-1-8. 
27   NOV. 2015 FDIC MANUAL, supra note 16, at VII-1.2. 
28   Id. 
29   Id. 
30   Id. 
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This assessment is generally made from an ex ante perspective.31  In other words, so 
long as institutions do not create unreasonable obstacles for consumers to make in-
formed decisions about their products, government regulators will generally not “sec-
ond guess” whether a consumer could have made a wiser decision after the fact.32  
Public policy considerations are also contemplated within this framework, though 
they do not serve as a primary basis for determining that an act or practice is unfair.33  
Regulators argue that the public at large is harmed by unfair acts or practices because 
consumers are steered into products that they otherwise would not have purchased.34  
In addition, preventing unfair acts or practices creates a more level playing field for 
businesses because responsible providers of products and services no longer have to 
compete with less scrupulous merchants.35 
 
2. The “Deceptive” Standard 
The FTC developed a separate three-part test to determine whether a representa-
tion, omission, or practice is “deceptive”: “First, the representation, omission, or 
practice must mislead or be likely to mislead the consumer.  Second, the consumer’s 
interpretation of the representation, omission, or practice must be reasonable under 
the circumstances.  Third, the misleading representation, omission, or practice must 
be material.”36  Unlike the standards for establishing unfairness, there is no require-
ment that a consumer take reasonable steps to avoid the injury or that the magnitude 
of the injury be weighed against countervailing public policy considerations.37  In 
addition, misleading representations “may be in the form of express or implied claims 
or promises and may be written or oral.”38  An omission may be considered deceptive 
if disclosure would be necessary to prevent a consumer from being misled.39  Further, 
representations and omissions are evaluated in the context of the entire advertise-
ment, transaction, or course of dealing—rather than in isolation—to determine 
whether they are misleading.40  The determination of whether an act or practice is 
misleading is evaluated from the perspective of the “reasonable consumer,” which is 
an objective standard based on how a reasonable member of the target audience for 
that product would interpret the marketing material.41  For example, disclosures bur-
ied in the fine print of a consumer contract are “generally insufficient to cure a mis-
leading headline or prominent written representation.”42  Finally, the materiality of a 
representation, omission, or practice is assessed on the basis of whether “it is likely 
                                                          
31   Id. 
32   Id.. 
33   Id. at VII-1.3. 
34   Id. 
35   Id. at VII-1.2–1.3. 
36   Id. at VII-1.3. 
37   Id. 
38   Id. 
39   Id. 
40   Id. 
41   Id. 
42   Id. at VII-1.3–1.4. See also id. at VII-1.4 n.9 (noting that “[w]hen evaluating the three-part test for 
deception, the four ‘Ps’ should be considered: prominence, presentation, placement, and proximity.”). 
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to affect a consumer’s decision to purchase or use a product or service” (emphasis 
added).43  An intent to deceive is not a required element of proving that an act or 
practice is deceptive.44  Rather, if it can be shown that the institution “intended that 
the consumer draw certain conclusions based upon the claim,” materiality will be 
presumed (emphasis added).45  Examples of acts or practices that have the potential 
to be deceptive include:  
[1] making misleading cost or price claims; [2] using bait-and-switch tech-
niques; [3] offering to provide a product or service that is not in fact avail-
able; [4] omitting material limitations or conditions from an offer; [5] sell-
ing a product unfit for the purposes for which it is sold; and [6] failing to 
provide promised services.46 
3.   The “Abusive” Standard 
 
Turning to the newest “A” in UDAAP, the CFPA defines an “abusive” act or 
practice as one that:  
 
(1)  Materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or 
condition of a consumer financial product or service; or  
 
(2)  takes unreasonable advantage of (A) a lack of understanding on the part of 
the consumer of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or ser-
vice; (B) the inability of the consumer to protect its interests in selecting or 
using a consumer financial product or service; or (C) the reasonable reliance 
by the consumer on a covered person to act in the interests of the con-
sumer.47  
 
To date, the Bureau has not issued a formal rule elaborating the standard(s) for 
“abusive” conduct.  Richard Cordray, the former Director of the CFPB, testified that, 
“for us [the Bureau] to define what abusive means [through rulemaking] feels a little 
presumptive, given that Congress defines what abusive means.”48  Indeed, the defi-
nition of “abusive” adopted by Congress provides several meaningful insights into 
the scope of its intended reach.  First, “abusive” is intended to be a more flexible 
standard than “unfair” or “deceptive,” affording regulators latitude to “address the 
rapid changes in the consumer financial industry.”49  Second, abusive conduct is sub-
ject to its own independent legal standard, indicating that practices that otherwise 
                                                          
43   Id. at VII-1.4. 
44   Id. 
45   Id. 
46   Id. at VII-1.3. 
47   12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (2012). 
48   Richard Corday, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Statement before the Fin. Serv. Comm. of the U.S. 
House of Representatives (Mar. 29, 2012) , https://www.c-span.org/video/?305214-1/consumer-fi-
nancial-protection-bureau-semiannual-report&start=2140. 
49   Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse: The Dodd–Frank and Consumer Fin. Protection Act’s ‘‘Abusive’’ 
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satisfy the three-prong tests for unfairness and deception may still be prohibited under 
the CFPA.  Third, the abusive standard places more weight on subjective criteria; for 
example, it does not include an objective cost-benefit analysis.  Fourth, abusive con-
duct generally implicates power or information imbalances between the consumer 
and the covered person.  A covered person exploits this imbalance when he or she 
“uses his or her superior understanding, power, or information to secure a transaction 
with terms that are so unreasonable that they can be explained only by the consumer’s 
lack of understanding, power or information.”50 
Some experts have posited that the addition of the abusive standard was meant 
to address deficiencies in the FTCA, as practices that rise to the level of unfairness 
or deception “present relatively extreme situations” that tend to limit prosecutions.51  
For example, in the mortgage lending context, lenders have successfully argued that 
certain transactions were “fair” because they represented a net tangible benefit to the 
borrower, even if the terms of the mortgage raised long-term questions about the 
borrower’s ability to repay it.52  Similarly, the “deceptive” test is difficult to meet 
because offending companies largely possess the industry data and documents nec-
essary for consumers to establish they made a false or misleading statement.53 
The CFPB has defended its enforcement-centered approach in part by noting that 
UDAAPs “can cause significant financial injury to consumers, erode consumer con-
fidence, and undermine fair competition in the financial marketplace.”54  The 
CFPB’s enforcement record in this regard has been prolific.  Since its inception in 
2011, the Bureau has provided approximately $11.7 billion in consumer relief from 
its supervisory and enforcement work and collected almost $440 million in civil pen-
alties.55  For example, in July 2015, Citibank agreed to pay almost $700 million in 
consumer relief and $35 million in civil monetary penalties to the CFPB to settle 
allegations of deceptive marketing practices and unfair billing practices related to 
certain credit card add-on products and services.56  
Given the significant financial penalties at stake,57 it comes as little surprise that 
                                                          
Standard, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 118, 120 (2011). 
50   Eric Mogilnicki & Eamonn K. Moran, Understanding and Applying Dodd-Frank’s ‘Abusive’ Stand-
ard, 104 BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 161, at 2 (Jan. 27, 2015). 
51   Testimony of John C. Dugan Comptroller of the Currency before the Comm. on the Fin. Serv. of the 
U.S. House Representatives, 110th Cong. 34 (2007). 
52   Lee, supra note 49, at 120. 
53   Id.  
54   CFPB, CFBP BULLETIN 13-07, PROHIBITION OF UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE, OR ABUSIVE ACTS OR PRAC-
TICES IN THE COLLECTION OF CONSUMER DEBTS 1 (July 10, 2013), http://files.consum-
erfinance.gov/f/201307_cfpb_bulletin_unfair-deceptive-abusive-practices.pdf. 
55   CFPB FACTSHEET – ENFORCING FEDERAL CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 1–2 (2016), available at 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/07132016_cfpb_SEFL_anniversary_factsheet.pdf. 
56   See Consent Order at 1, 36, 45 Citibank, N.A., 2015 CFPB 0015 (2015) (alleging, inter alia, “viola-
tions deceptive acts or practices relating to the marketing and sale of, and membership retention for, certain 
Respondent credit card add-on products in violation of Sections 1031(a) and 1036(a)(1)(B) of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Act of 2010 (CFPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), 5536(a)(1)(B)”). 
57   See 12 U.S.C. § 5565 (2012) (providing that “[a]ny person that violates, through any act or omission, 
any provision of Federal consumer financial law shall forfeit and pay a civil penalty . . .” up to $1 million per 
day for “any person that knowingly violates a Federal consumer financial law.). 
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the CFPB has faced backlash from supervised bank and nonbank entities for its ag-
gressive approach to UDAAP enforcement.  Supervised entities have recently chal-
lenged the Bureau’s stance in court, arguing that the terms embedded in UDAAP are 
unconstitutionally vague because they fail to provide fair notice of allegedly prohib-
ited conduct, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.58  Con-
gress has also responded by proposing legislation that would effectively strip the Bu-
reau of its UDAAP rulemaking and enforcement authority altogether.59 
 
II. CHALLENGES TO THE CFPB’S UDAAP ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY 
 
A. SELECTED JUDICIAL CHALLENGES 
 
1. CFPB v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc. 
In February 2014, the Bureau filed a groundbreaking lawsuit against for-profit 
education giant ITT Educational Services, Inc. (“ITT”).  ITT was a publicly-traded 
for-profit secondary educational institution that previously operated 149 locations in 
38 states.60  The Bureau argued that ITT was a “covered person” under the CFPA 
because it engaged in the provision of consumer financial products or services to 
students—specifically, by “offering or providing loans, through certain private loan 
programs, to its students to pay for a portion of ITT’s tuition.”61 
Students were ITT’s sole source of revenue.  However, the average ITT student 
has a poor credit history and low earnings; thus, he or she can rarely pay for ITT’s 
substantial tuition out-of-pocket.62  As a result, students relied heavily on govern-
ment loans to finance their education.  In 2012, about ninety-six percent of ITT’s 
cash receipts came from the government—either in the form of Title IV aid pro-
grams,63 or from federal benefits for service members and veterans and state aid pro-
grams.64  Prior to 2008, ITT students relied on third-party lenders to finance the costs 
of their education above those covered by loans or grants.  However, in the wake of 
the financial crisis, these sources largely dried up.  As a result, ITT began offering its 
students “Temporary Credits,” which were loans arranged by ITT that were payable 
in a single lump sum payment at the end of the academic year.65  ITT lent students 
                                                          
58    See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that “no person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law).  See also, e.g., Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 10, Consumer 
Fin. Prot. Bureau v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:14-CV-00292-SEB, 2015 WL 1013508 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 28, 
2014) (arguing that the terms “unfair” and “abusive,” both on their face and as applied, “failed to provide suf-
ficient notice of what is proscribed and violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
59    See, e.g., H.R. 2612, 112 Cong. (2011) (amending the Dodd-Frank Act to repeal the Bureau’s au-
thority to “(1) prohibit unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in connection with any transaction with a 
consumer for, or the offering of, a consumer financial product or service; and (2) promulgate regulations to 
prevent such practices.”).  
60   Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages at 2, CFPB v. ITT Educ. Serv., Inc., No. 1:14-CV-
00292-SEB, 2015 WL 1013508 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2015). 
61   Id. at 17. 
62   See id. at 5 (noting that a two-year associate’s degree program at ITT costs approximately $44,000). 
63   See Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 1070 (2012). 
64   Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages at 25, CFPB v. ITT Educ. Serv., Inc., No. 1:14-CV-
00292-SEB, 2015 WL 1013508 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2015). 
65   Id. at 6. 
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approximately $100 million to $150 million per year in Temporary Credit from 2009 
to 2011.66  The Bureau alleged that ITT knew that the majority of its Temporary 
Credit recipients would be unable to repay the lump sum payments within nine 
months.67  Nevertheless, ITT allegedly coerced students into incurring Temporary 
Credit obligations but provided minimal disclosures about the terms of the pro-
gram.68  In addition, ITT staff allegedly mischaracterized the Credits as a source of 
“funding” to cover costs above those covered by loans or grants and told students that 
they did not need to be repaid.69 
ITT created two private loan programs in 2008 intended to serve as a vehicle for 
students to pay off their Temporary Credit (the “Private Loan” programs).70  Osten-
sibly, these programs were created: (1) to reduce the amount of Temporary Credit 
outstanding; (2) convert the Credits into immediate income; and (3) help ITT avoid 
lending students any further amounts from its own accounts after their first year.71  
However, these Private Loans carried high fees and high interest rates, had fewer 
options to reduce monthly payments than federal loans, and were not dischargeable 
in bankruptcy absent a special showing of undue hardship.72 
The Bureau alleged that ITT violated the CFPA’s prohibition against abusive 
practices by taking “unreasonable advantage of ITT students’ inability to protect their 
interests in selecting or using the ITT Private Loans.”73  It cited ITT’s aggressive 
tactics to coerce students into taking out the Private Loans, including the threat of 
expulsion, as evidence of ITT’s intent to exploit its students’ financial vulnerabili-
ties.74  The Private Loan program was also characterized as abusive because it took 
unreasonable advantage of ITT students’ reasonable reliance on ITT to act in their 
interests.75  ITT’s Financial Aid staff allegedly employed high pressure sales tactics 
to push students into taking on high-risk loans they knew they could not repay in 
order to improve the appearance of ITT’s financial statements and boost ITT’s stock 
price.76  ITT allegedly took advantage of students in other ways as well.  Publicly, 
ITT held itself out as an institution that could help students obtain more desirable 
jobs and higher incomes.  However, the Bureau alleged that ITT published mislead-
ing employment data that “did not represent realistic outcomes for most ITT stu-
dents.”77 
Similarly, the Bureau charged that ITT’s Private Loan program practices were 
unfair under the CFPA because they interfered with students’ ability to make in-
formed, uncoerced choices.78  As ITT students generally possessed limited financial 
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means, they had no meaningful choice in deciding whether to select ITT’s Private 
Loans to finance their education.  Further, the Bureau noted that, “[g]iven the virtual 
non-transferability of ITT credits, most students were forced to either take the ITT 
Private Loans or forfeit their entire investment.”79 
ITT challenged the Bureau’s Complaint on several grounds.  It disputed the Bu-
reau’s characterization of its practices as unfair and abusive and argued that the CFPB 
failed to provide sufficient notice of what conduct was proscribed by these terms.80  
As a result, ITT argued that the Bureau’s UDAAP claims under the CPFA should be 
dismissed as unconstitutionally vague.81  ITT further asserted that the CFPA’s man-
date to prohibit unfair and abusive practices in the consumer finance industry was 
unconstitutional because it amounted to sweeping, standardless delegation of legis-
lative authority to the CFPB.82 
The U.S. Supreme Court previously addressed the “void for vagueness” doctrine 
in the civil context involving another administrative agency, the Federal Communi-
cations Commission (“FCC”).  In F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., the Court 
noted that this doctrine: 
addresses at least two connected but discrete due process concerns: [1] 
Regulated parties should know what is required of them so they may act 
accordingly; and [2] precision and guidance are necessary so that those 
enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.83 
As a general matter, the District Court in ITT, citing Fox, indicated that it would 
“refuse to apply a statutory standard only where it is so amorphous that reasonable 
observers have no choice but to ‘guess at its meaning[,] and differ as to its applica-
tion.”84  The court also clarified that the degree of vagueness tolerated by the Consti-
tution, as well as “the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement,” de-
pends in part on whether the statute imposes criminal or civil penalties, noting that 
“less clarity is demanded of laws or regulations that are enforced through civil action 
rather than prosecution.”85  Further the court reasoned that, as the CFPA regulates 
economic activity—as opposed to a protected constitutional interest like free expres-
sion—it is subject to a more lenient vagueness test.86 
The court held that the CFPA’s prohibition of “unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices” was not unconstitutionally vague, noting that these terms were largely adopted 
                                                          
79   Id. at 171. 
80   See Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 10-12, CFPB v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 
1:14-CV-00292-SEB, 2015 WL 1013508 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2015). 
81   Id. at 11. 
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83   FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 240 (2012). 
84   CFPB v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 878, 900 (citing Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 
U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). 
85   Id. at 900 (citing Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982)). 
86   Id. at 902 (citing Illinois v. Alta Colleges, Inc., No. 14-C-3786, 2014 WL 4377579, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 4, 2014)). 
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from the FTCA, the meaning of which “has been given concrete shape by successive 
generations of interpretation and refinement.”87  Thus, the court rejected ITT’s con-
tention that “a reasonable business entity would be forced to guess at the term’s 
meaning,[sic] or would be subject to [the] agency’s standardless discretion in its en-
forcement.”88 
The court also held that the CFPA’s use of the word “abusive” passed constitu-
tional muster.  The court’s reasoning turned on two existing federal statutes that ad-
dressed abusive practices in connection with debt collection and telemarketing prac-
tices, respectively.  The first—The Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”) 
—was enacted to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors”89 
and includes a non-exhaustive list of exemplars of such abusive conduct.90  The court 
noted that the FDCPA had been on the books for nearly forty years and the FTC had 
brought over sixty enforcement actions pursuant to this provision.91  This extensive 
enforcement record, in turn, “[enabled] the growth of an appreciable corpus of judi-
cial commentary explicating the meaning of abusive treatment of consumers.”92  
Similarly, the court pointed to the Federal Telemarketing Sales Rule (“FTSR”),93 
promulgated by the FTC pursuant to the Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention 
Act,94 as further evidence that defendants in ITT’s position had ample access to il-
lustrative guidance on abusive practices.95  The court concluded that the CFPA’s 
clear prescriptive language regarding abusive conduct, combined with the use and 
interpretation of this term in other related consumer protection statutes, provided “at 
least the minimal level of clarity that the due process clause demands of non-criminal 
economic regulation.”96 
 
2. CFPB v. Navient Corp. 
More recently, the Bureau filed a Complaint against Navient Corporation and 
two of its subsidiaries responsible for student loan servicing and collection.  Navient 
is the largest student loan servicer in the U.S. and services loans for over 12 million 
borrowers, representing over $300 billion in federal and private student loans.97  The 
Bureau alleged that Navient’s practice of steering students experiencing financial 
hardship into forbearance programs—rather than income-driven repayment plans—
was abusive.98  The CFPB noted that forbearance programs, which permit eligible 
borrowers to make reduced monthly payments or stop making payments on their 
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loans for a defined period of time, are generally more suitable to borrowers experi-
encing temporary financial hardship or illness.99  However, long-term enrollment in 
forbearance programs often comes at a significant cost.  For example, any unpaid 
interest is generally added to the principal amount of the borrower’s loan, which can 
greatly increase the borrower’s monthly payment over the repayment term.100  By 
contrast, income-based repayment plans afford several benefits to borrowers facing 
prolonged financial hardship.  As the title implies, these repayment programs are 
generally tailored to the borrower’s income and family size, with some plans offering 
starting payments of as little as $0 per month.101  In addition, some of these plans 
include interest subsidies, where the federal government essentially pays any unpaid 
interest that accrues on the loan during the first three years of the repayment plan.102  
This feature mitigates the risk of “payment shock” to the borrower that can occur 
under a forbearance plan, where the unpaid interest is capitalized.  Other income-
driven plans allow for forgiveness of the remaining principal balance of the loan after 
the borrower makes a certain number of qualifying payments.103 
The Bureau further argued that Navient obtained an unreasonable benefit from 
this practice at the borrowers’ expense because forbearance plans are generally more 
efficient to administer and less costly than other repayment plans, which reduced 
Navient’s operating costs.104  Specifically, the CFPB noted that this practice took 
unreasonable advantage of student’s reasonable reliance on Navient to help them se-
lect a repayment plan that was in their best interests.105  In support of its position, the 
Bureau pointed to numerous statements on Navient’s website indicating that Navient 
was committed to helping borrowers find the repayment option that best fits their 
budget.106 
In addition, the CFPB charged that Navient’s servicing practices were unfair un-
der the CFPA.107  The Bureau alleged that, over a period of several years, “Navient 
steered hundreds of thousands of federal student loan borrowers experiencing long-
term financial hardship into multiple consecutive forbearances that spanned 
years.”108  As a result, these borrowers suffered substantial injury in the form of sig-
nificantly higher loan principal balances due to accumulated accrued interest.109  Fur-
ther, the Bureau reasoned that the injury was not reasonably avoidable because Na-
vient furnished little or inadequate information regarding alternative repayment 
plans; consequently, borrowers were unable to make informed decisions regarding 
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the most appropriate plan for their financial situation.110 
The Bureau also characterized certain servicing and collection practices as de-
ceptive.  These included: (1) creating the false and misleading impression that provid-
ing incomplete or inaccurate renewal applications for certain loan repayment pro-
grams would only result in processing delays, without disclosing the possibility for 
adverse financial implications;111 and (2) representing that completing a “rehabilita-
tion program”112 would remove adverse information regarding the student loan from 
the borrower’s credit report, but failing to disclose that the trade line reflecting late 
payments and delinquencies prior to default would remain.113 
Similar to ITT, Navient brought a due process challenge to the CFPB’s UDAAP 
enforcement authority and asserted that the Bureau “has never exercised its rulemak-
ing power to ‘identify[] unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices under Federal 
law,’ much less the specific conduct at issue here (emphasis supplied).”114  Employ-
ing a nuanced textual and structural analysis, Navient argued that the text of the 
Dodd-Frank Act constrained the Bureau’s ability to “declare” an act or practice to be 
unlawful in absence of formal rulemaking.115  Without this textual limitation, Na-
vient argued that the CFPB could essentially bring an enforcement suit against a cov-
ered entity and argue that unfairness and abusiveness mean whatever the Bureau 
wants it to mean.116 
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied 
Navient’s Motion to Dismiss in its entirety on August 4, 2017.117  The court re-
framed Navient’s due process challenge and stated that the relevant inquiry was not 
whether Navient had fair notice of the Bureau’s interpretation of the CFPA, but ra-
ther whether it had fair notice of what the Act requires.118  Here, the court drew 
parallels with another Third Circuit case, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.119  In 
Wyndham, the FTC alleged that the defendants’ deficient cybersecurity measures 
failed to protect consumer data against hackers and constituted an “unfair” practice 
under the FTC Act.120  Similar to Navient, Wyndham charged that the FTC had failed 
to promulgate a relevant rule or adjudication on the matter of unfairness, and thus the 
FTC Act, “as applied” to its cybersecurity practices, failed on due process 
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grounds.121  In absence of an FTC rule or adjudication that merited agency deference, 
the FTC in Wyndham relied on “ordinary judicial interpretation of a civil statute” to 
interpret the FTC Act “in the first instance” and decide whether it prohibited the al-
leged conduct.122  The District Court in Navient, citing the Third Circuit’s decision 
in Wyndham, held that Navient’s fair notice argument failed as a matter of law and 
clarified that “[f]air notice is satisfied . . . as long as the company can reasonably 
foresee that a court could construe its conduct as falling within the meaning of the 
statute.”123 
 
B. RECENT LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGES 
Almost immediately after the Bureau “went live” in July 2011, it faced legisla-
tive challenges that threatened to clip the wings of its enforcement powers.  For ex-
ample, H.R. 2612, sponsored by Florida Rep. Connie Mack IV (R-FL), sought to 
repeal the CFPB’s ability to promulgate regulations relating to UDAAPs and prohibit 
the Bureau from bringing enforcement actions to prohibit the same.124  Although this 
rather targeted bill failed to emerge from committee hearings, a more comprehensive 
proposal to overhaul the CFPB has gained more traction as of late.  The Financial 
CHOICE (“Creating Hope and Opportunity for Investors, Consumers, and Entrepre-
neurs”) Act of 2016,125 introduced by House Financial Services Committee Chair 
Rep. Jeb Hensarling (R-TX), spanned over five hundred pages in length and con-
tained a series of proposed changes to the Bureau’s structure and functions.  While a 
comprehensive discussion of the CHOICE Act is beyond the scope of this Note, the 
Act was broadly designed to provide regulatory relief from certain Dodd-Frank re-
quirements to bank and nonbank financial institutions.126  For starters, the Act effec-
tively proposed to “re-brand” the CFPB as the “Consumer Financial Opportunity 
Commission” (“CFOC”).127  But the list of its “amendments” to Dodd-Frank went 
far beyond mere cosmetic changes.  Indeed, the corresponding changes to the Bu-
reau’s mandate provide instructive cues as to the anti-consumer, pro-industry senti-
ment that permeates much the rest of the Bill.128  Some sections reflect an inherent 
distrust of the Bureau’s perceived power, particularly amidst charges that it is an un-
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constitutional entity insulated from any meaningful checks by the Executive or Leg-
islative branches.129  To that end, H.R. 5983 proposed to replace the single-Director 
structure of the CFPB with a multimember commission, similar to the current lead-
ership of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (“CFTC”).130  This version of the CHOICE Act also repealed 
the Bureau’s ability to prohibit abusive practices, although consumers would still re-
tain limited protections against UDAPs perpetuated by covered entities.131 
In the spring of 2017, House Republicans announced plans to introduce an up-
dated version of the bill, dubbed the CHOICE Act “2.0,” that promised to build on 
existing attempts to amend, repeal, or replace key Dodd-Frank provisions.132  Similar 
to its predecessor, the new bill proposed another facelift to the Bureau’s name.133  
But whereas CHOICE “1.0” at least tacitly acknowledged the important supervisory 
role the Bureau plays over bank and nonbank institutions, its progeny proposed to 
dismantle the Bureau’s supervisory and examination functions altogether.134  Among 
other shortcomings, this feature would severely limit the Bureau’s ability to prospec-
tively limit potential harm to consumers—for example, by identifying compliance 
issues found in the course of routine examinations.135  Significantly, the rebranded 
CLEA would also lose all of its UDAAP rulemaking and enforcement capabilities 
under CHOICE 2.0.  While the bill passed the House in June, largely along party 
lines, its ultimate fate remains unclear.  Some industry commentators have posited 
that elements of the comprehensive bill will be partitioned and considered separately, 
or that Senate Republicans will need to come up with their own version of the 
CHOICE Act, with at least some bipartisan support.136  Apparently lost among par-
tisan attempts by Republican lawmakers to mischaracterize the Bureau as an omnip-
otent bureaucracy are headline-grabbing statistics reminding all Americans of the 
significant rights the Bureau has vindicated on their behalf.  For example, according 
to data published by the Bureau, the CFPB brought over 125 enforcement actions that 
utilized UDAAP through July 2017 (roughly sixty-five percent of total enforcement 
actions).137  As a result, over 26.3 million consumers have been entitled to over $10.8 
billion in consumer relief through monetary redress, debt cancellation, or principal 
reduction.138  Regardless of the perceived shortcomings of the Dodd-Frank Act more 
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generally, it would seem antithetical to the legislative process to paint over the Bu-
reau’s short, impressive history with such broad brush strokes. 
III. THE CASE FOR UPHOLDING THE CFPB’S APPROACH TO UDAAP ENFORCE-
MENT 
 
A. THE BUREAU HAS ISSUED SUBSTANTIVE GUIDANCE ON UNFAIR, DECEP-
TIVE, AND ABUSIVE PRACTICES THROUGH COMPLIANCE BULLETINS 
The CFPB has published a series of bulletins that provide additional guidance 
for regulated entities seeking to understand the contours of the Bureau’s UDAAP 
enforcement authority.  These publications touch on a variety of topics, including: 
(1) consumer debt collection; (2) credit reporting; (3) consumer credit cards; and (4) 
pay-by-phone services.   
 
1. CFPB Bulletin 2013-07: Prohibition of Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or 
Practices in the Collection of Consumer Debts 
 
In July 2013, the Bureau published guidance on consumer debt collection prac-
tices.  The Bulletin stated that conduct which contravenes the FDCPA could also 
constitute a UDAAP prohibited by the Dodd-Frank Act.139  While the FDCPA gen-
erally only applies to third-party debt collectors and debt purchasers, the Bureau clar-
ified that all “[o]riginal creditors and other covered persons and service providers 
under the Dodd-Frank Act involved in collecting debt related to any consumer finan-
cial product or service are subject to the prohibition against UDAAPs in the Dodd-
Frank Act.”140  The Bureau also created a non-exhaustive list of ten practices or pat-
terns of conduct related to the collection of consumer debts that could constitute 
UDAAPs.141 
 
2. CFPB Bulletin 2013-08: Representations Regarding Effect of Debt        Pay-
ments on Credit Reports and Scores 
 
The CFPB published a second contemporaneous Bulletin in July 2013 detailing 
additional guidance applicable to creditors, debt buyers, and third-party debt collec-
tors.142  The Bureau expressed concern over representations made by these entities 
regarding the relationship between paying debts in collection and a consumer’s credit 
report.143  It cited observations gleaned from its recent supervisory investigations and 
enforcement investigations indicating that certain debt owners and debt collectors 
were engaging in a pattern of material misrepresentations, including: (1) representing 
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that payments on certain “obsolete debts” would remove negative information about 
the debt from the consumer’s credit report, even though the information would likely 
not have appeared on the credit report had the debt remained unpaid; (2) representing 
that payments on debts in collection would improve the borrower’s credit score, when 
in reality an individual’s credit score is influenced by numerous factors; and (3) rep-
resenting that paying debts in collection would improve the borrower’s creditworthi-
ness or likelihood of subsequently receiving credit from a lender, even though lenders 
often assign differing weights to information used to evaluate a borrower’s credit-
worthiness, including credit report or credit score information.144 
The CFPB took the position that these misrepresentations, which would likely 
be illegal under the FDCPA,145 may also constitute a deceptive practice under the 
Dodd-Frank Act.146  The Bureau put debt collectors on notice that it would review 
their internal policies and procedures in the course of its supervision activities or 
enforcement investigations to assess whether they are “making these types of claims 
and the factual basis for them.”147 
 
3. CFPB Bulletin 2014-02: Marketing of Credit Card Promotional APR Offers 
 
In September 2014, the Bureau issued a Bulletin addressing advertising practices 
in connection with certain credit card promotional offers.148  The Bulletin cautioned 
credit card issuers that certain solicitations offering a promotional annual percentage 
rate (“APR”) on particular transactions over a defined period of time may constitute 
a deceptive and/or abusive act or practice under the CFPA.149  The Bureau cited pro-
motions offering consumers the ability to transfer their credit card balance at a low 
or zero percent APR as an area of particular concern.  In some instances, consumers 
may benefit from these promotions by paying off higher APR credit cards or tapping 
into cheaper sources of credit to finance a large purchase over a period of time.150  
However, these potential benefits often come with conditions—namely, a transaction 
fee for accepting the offer, and a requirement that the consumer pay the full statement 
balance on the credit card by the payment due date.151  If the consumer fails to pay 
the statement balance in full—including the amount subject to the promotional 
APR—he or she will lose the benefit of the “grace period” typically afforded to in-
terest charges.152 
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The Bureau found that some card issuers conveyed the misimpression to con-
sumers that the only cost of obtaining the low promotional APR was the transaction 
fee for accepting the offer.  In addition, they did not prominently disclose the fact 
that consumers may incur additional interest charges on later purchases if they do not 
pay their balances in full (and thus restore the “grace period” for incurring these 
charges).153  Further, they failed to cure these misimpressions.154  The Bureau con-
cluded that this misrepresentation would be material from the standpoint of the “rea-
sonable consumer” because it pertains to a central characteristic of the product (its 
cost).155  Thus, it could constitute a deceptive advertising practice under the CFPA.  
In addition, the Bulletin clarified the conditions under which these practices could be 
deemed abusive.156 
 
4. CFPB Bulletin 2017-01: Phone Pay Fees 
 
More recently, the Bureau addressed the potential for UDAAP violations in as-
sessing fees for pay-by-phone services employed by certain financial services pro-
viders.157  These entities may charge different phone pay fees depending on the pay-
ment method selected by the consumer.158  However, in some instances, the CFPB 
found that these entities or their third-party service providers failed to disclose these 
fees or failed to inform consumers of the material price difference between available 
phone payment options.159  In another case, the Bureau described a service provider 
that engaged in the deceptive practice of giving delinquent credit card holders the 
false impression that their sole payment choice was a $14.95 pay-by-phone option 
when there were other no-cost payment alternatives available.160  The CFPB also 
indicated that “production incentives” or other incentive-based programs employed 
by some providers may increase the risk of these entities engaging in UDAAPs.161  
In particular, they noted that these programs, which often reward employees based 
on their ability to steer consumers into higher-cost payment options, create a risk that 
consumers will be inadequately informed about the availability of lower-cost alter-
natives.162 
 
B. THE BUREAU’S RECENT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE 
PLAIN STATUTORY MANDATE OF THE CFPA AND ARE NARROWLY TAILORED 
                                                          
153  CFBP Bulletin 14-02, Marketing of Credit Card Promotional APR OFFERS 2–3 (Sept. 3, 2014). 
154  Id. at 2. 
155  Id. at 3. 
156  See id. at 3–4 (indicating that, “[d]epending on all of the facts and circumstances, an issuer may take 
unreasonable advantage of such consumers by failing to adequately inform them of these conditions and by 
exploiting their lack of understanding to impose additional costs.”). 
157  CFBP Bulletin 17-01, Phone Pay FEES (July 31, 2017). 
158  Id. at 2. 
159  Id. at 1–2. 
160  Id. at 3 (citing Citibank, N.A., No. 2015-CFPB-0015 (CFPB, July 21, 2015)). 
161  Id. at 5. 
162  Id. 
  
78 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 45:3] 
TO ROOTING OUT ONLY THE MOST EGREGIOUS CASES OF UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE, 
OR ABUSIVE CONDUCT 
In addition to the cases discussed in Part II, supra, the Bureau has promulgated 
extensive guidance to covered entities in the form of enforcement actions, which il-
lustrate a consistent approach to applying UDAAP standards.  In particular, these 
matters reflect a tailored approach by the CFPB that targets particularly egregious 
conduct in the financial marketplace and does not represent an abuse of the agency’s 
own discretion. 
For example, in December 2014, the Bureau took firm action against two student 
debt relief scams that reaped millions of dollars of illegal fees from student borrowers 
and made false representations regarding their services and affiliations.163  One en-
tity—doing business as College Education Services (“CES”)—was even banned 
from participating in the debt relief business altogether.  The Bureau alleged that CES 
engaged in deceptive advertising practices by materially misrepresenting that their 
“debt relief” services would result in lower monthly payments for student loan bor-
rowers and failed to deliver on these promises.164  In addition, the CFPB charged that 
CES’ “loan counselors” engaged in abusive practices by taking unreasonable ad-
vantage of financially distressed consumers and failing to act in their best interests—
often by steering them into costly loan consolidation programs rather than offering 
them individualized advice.165  The other entity operated under the fictitious name, 
“Student Loan Processing.US” and falsely implied to consumers that it was affiliated 
with the U.S. Department of Education.166  The CFPB charged that this was a mate-
rial misrepresentation in violation of the CFPA’s prohibition of deceptive prac-
tices.167 
In May 2015, the popular online payment system PayPal entered into a consent 
decree with the Bureau in stemming from allegations relating to its online credit prod-
uct, PayPal Credit.168  The CFPB alleged that PayPal engaged in deceptive advertis-
ing practices by failing to honor advertised promotions, such as credits toward con-
sumer purchases.  More strikingly, the Bureau uncovered evidence indicating that 
PayPal enrolled consumers in PayPal Credit automatically and without their con-
sent−often when signing up for a regular PayPal account or making purchases.  This 
was appropriately deemed to be an unfair practice under the CFPA as it was (1) 
clearly not reasonably avoidable by consumers and (2) was likely to cause substantial 
injury, as consumers may fail to make payments or incur late fees and interest on 
accounts that they do not know exists. 
                                                          
163  Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Takes Action to End Student “Debt Relief” Scams (Dec. 11, 2014), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-to-end-student-debt-relief-scams/. 
164  Complaint for Permanent Injunction, Civil Money Penalties, and Other Relief at 14, CFPB v. College 
Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 8:14CV3078T36EAJ, (M.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2014). 
165  Id. at 14–16. 
166  Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 8-9, CFPB v. IrvineWebWorks, No. 8:14-
CV-1967, (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2014). 
167  Id. at 15–16. 
168 Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Takes Action Against PayPal for Illegally Signing up Consumers for 
Unwanted Online Credit (May 19, 2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-
action-against-paypal-for-illegally-signing-up-consumers-for-unwanted-online-credit/. 
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In perhaps the most shocking illustration of the need for the CFPB’s UDAAP 
enforcement in recent memory, the Bureau in 2016 fined retail banking giant Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A. $100 million for its highly-publicized practice of opening unau-
thorized deposit and credit card accounts without consumer authorization.169  The 
CFPB’s analysis indicated that Wells Fargo employees opened over 1.5 million un-
authorized deposit accounts, often through “simulated funding,” whereby funds from 
consumers’ existing accounts were transferred to the unauthorized account.170  These 
actions clearly contravened the CFPA’s prohibition of abusive practices as (1) con-
sumers could not protect their own interest in avoiding account fees or other charges 
as they did not have an opportunity to offer affirmative assent to these unauthorized 
account agreements; and (2) consumers were not afforded an opportunity to be ap-
prised of the terms or conditions of these accounts. 
While each of these enforcement actions implicates a different set of facts, a 
consistent pattern emerges.  Namely, to date the Bureau has applied its UDAAP en-
forcement authority to a narrow range of conduct that: (1) is clearly proscribed by the 
plain meaning of the terms “unfair,” “deceptive,” and “abusive,” as set forth in the 
CFPA; (2) is appropriately tailored to more extreme cases of consumer abuse, har-
assment, and exploitation as opposed to conduct that is “at the margins” of propriety; 
and (3) does not present meaningful due process concerns to responsible financial 
services providers. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Nearly every federal agency tasked with some form of oversight or enforcement 
authority operates within a sphere of compromise.  For the CFPB, this compromise 
may be framed as a desire to facilitate consumer choice in a market economy while 
making it incumbent on financial providers to ensure that consumers have the infor-
mation to make these choices responsibly.  Providing access to consumer credit from 
responsible financial services providers is undoubtedly important, and that is partic-
ularly true for unbanked and underbanked Americans, who often possess limited fi-
nancial or educational means.171  Although the Bureau was vested with significant 
statutory authority to administer and enforce federal consumer laws, its short history 
illustrates that it has channeled this power responsibly in order to tackle particularly 
egregious practices that often targeted the most vulnerable members of society.  Pro-
hibiting UDAAPs in the consumer financial marketplace may be used both as a sword 
and a shield that will help restore confidence in a system that drew much deserved 
ire from the American public in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
Perhaps the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s 2009 proposal outlining its vision 
                                                          
169 Press Release, CFPB, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Fines Wells Fargo $100 Million for 
Widespread Illegal Practice of Secretly Opening Unauthorized Accounts (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.consum-
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for the CFPB best articulates this sentiment: 
Consumer protection is a critical foundation for our financial system.  It 
gives the public confidence that financial markets are fair and enables pol-
icy makers and regulators to maintain stability in regulation.  Stable reg-
ulation, in turn, promotes growth, efficiency, and innovation over the long 
term. 
. . . To instill a genuine culture of consumer protection and not merely of 
legal compliance in our financial institutions, we need first to instill that 
culture in the federal regulatory structure.172 
 
                                                          
172  Dep’t. of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform – A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial 
Supervision and Regulation 56 (June 17, 2009), available at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-re-
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